这并不意味着林德贝克或者大多数的瑞典经济学家是完全错误的。林德贝克从来没有用适当的计量经济学方法来给他的国际增长比较研究奠定基础,即使正确地使用了这种方法,其本身的有效性仍然值得怀疑。他并没有用证据证明激励机制的正确性,理论仍然无法得到证实。在《经济问题的辩论》中,大多数关于市场自由主义的论证都是来自理论,而不是来自真实测量。但即使理论是无效的,论证依然要有。实际上,如果人们不相信理论,那么规范性的论证就是唯一的指导。这就是林德贝克的前任纲纳·缪达尔在他的研究成果《经济理论中的政治因素》(The Political Element in Economic Theory ,1930年)一书中一贯的主题。林德贝克的论证可能对他不利,但是我们认为他对激进市场主义的抑制是一种美德。也许瑞典公共部门的规模确实太大了(虽然原始数据被夸大了——现金收益要纳税,所以净支出就更低,而且应纳税的税率远远低于边缘税率,这样就可以被不同的抵扣抵消)。也许工作太繁重,闲暇太容易了,并不存在独立于意识形态和自身利益的可以用来做判断的客观标准。林德贝克承认科学的权威,正像诺贝尔奖放射出来的光芒一样。但是如果要做一种解释的话,只能是参考某种价值观。公共部门为什么规模变得这么大呢?代表谁的利益?工作和金钱比闲暇重要多少呢?女性在家照顾孩子比独立赚取工资好多少呢?体力劳动者谈判能力的下降在多大程度上能被用来削弱他们的安全保障呢?这是争论真正应该关注的问题,而不是关于“效率”的欺骗性的论证。效率是为了谁呢?以谁的利益为代价?这些就是纲纳·缪达尔曾经提出的问题。
[3] Wallander,‘En Effektivare Kreditpolitik’(1982).Wallander was a senior banker;Lindvall,The Politics of Purpose(2004),116-119,141.
[4] Lindvall,The Politics of Purpose(2004),116-119,141;Svensson,November-revolutionen(1996);Blyth,Great Transformations(2002),223-224.
[5] Chapter 4,above.
[6] Lundberg,‘The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Model’(1985),32-33.
[7] Feldt,Alla Dessa Dagar(1991),I,254-255.
[8] Lars Hansson,‘Mot en Marknadskonform Kreditpolitik’,28 August 1985,Stockholm,Swedish Central Bank Archive,Riksbankschefers Arkiv,Box:B.Dennis,Översyn av Kredit-och Valutapolitiken 1985,F1A:236.
[9] Lindbeck interview,3 December 2012.On the crisis,see Jonung et al.,The Great Financial Crisis(2009),and Honkaphoja,‘The 1990.s Financial Crisis in Nordic Countries’(2009).
[10] Eklund,‘En Intellektuell Biografi’(1995).
[11] Meyerson et al.,Maktenöver Bostaden(1990).
[12] Clark and Johnson,‘The“System Switch”in Swedish Housing’(2009);Stenfors,‘The Swedish Financial System’(2014),113-125.
[13] Roberts-Hughes,The Case for Space(2011);Hills,Ends and Means(2007).
[14] Ljungqvist and Sargent,‘How Sweden.s Unemployment Became More Like Europe.s’(2010).
[15] Lönnroth,Schamanerna(1993),269.
[16] Lindbeck,Ekonomi(2012),295.
[17] Soon published in English(without the supporting papers)as Lindbeck et al.,Turning Sweden Around(1994).
[18] Klein,Shock Doctrine:The Rise of Disaster Capitalism(2007).
[19] Lindbeck in 1981:chapter 9,note 82,above.
[20] Blyth,Great Transformations(2002),228.
[21] Ibid.,235.
[22] Lindbeck,Ekonomi,297-298.
[23] Heyman et al.,‘The Turnaround of Swedish Industry’(2015).Our discussion refers to this article.Also argued in Bergh and Henrekson,Varför Går det Braför Sverige(2012).
[24] Heyman et al.,‘The Turnaround of Swedish Industry’(2015),4-6.
[25] Ibid.,fig.2,5.
[26] Calculated from GDP per capita at constant 2005 prices and PPPs,US dollars,OECD,OECD.Stat(2015).
[27] See figure 9.1,above,and Heyman et al.,‘The Turnaround of Swedish In-dustry’,fig.3,5.
[28] Ibid.,fig.15,24.
[29] Magnusson,‘Globalisering och den Svenska Modellen’(2014).
[30] Heyman et al.,‘The Turnaround of Swedish Industry’(2015),3.
[31] Myrdal,Political Element(1953),ch.1;Lönnroth,Schamanerna(1993),ch.2;Carlson,The State as Monster(1994).
[32] Steinmo,Evolution of Modern States(2010),62.
[33] ILO,‘ILO Comparable Estimates’.
[34] Brittan,‘The Not So Noble Nobel Prize’(2003);Nasar,A Beautiful Mind(1998),368-372.
[35] Korpi,‘Eurosclerosis and the Sclerosis of Objectivity’(1996),1744,nn.43-44.
[36] Agell,‘Why Sweden.s Welfare State Needed Reform’(1996),1760.
[37] In 1993.Cited in Blyth,Great Transformations(2002),238.
[38] Lindbeck,‘Overshooting,Reform and Retreat of the Welfare State’(1993),28.
[39] Wooldridge,‘Special Report:The Nordic Countries’,Economist,2 February 2013.